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Fhe Court reviews for correctness the trial court's conclusion that the eyewitness 
identification evidence is reliable. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provision is relevant to the disposition of this case: 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 16, 1999 defendant was charged aggravated burglary, robbery, unlawful 
possession of burglary tools, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia (R. 20-22). 
Following a three-day trial held January 19-21, 2000, a jury found defendant guilty of 
unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, but failed to reach a verdict on the three 
remaining counts (R. 252:295-301). The trial judge declared a "hung jury" and scheduled 
a new trial (R. 252:300-02). 
On April 24,2000, after the initial trial, defendant filed a motion to exclude the 
victim's, Ms. Gaffney's, eyewitness identification of defendant (R. 172-180). Following a 
hearing, the trial court ruled that, based on Ms. Gaffney's testimony at the first trial, her 
eyewitness identification of defendant was reliable and would be admissible at the impending 
second trial (R. 253: 34-35).l In addition, the trial court denied the State's motion to exclude 
the testimony of Dr. David Dodd, defendant's eyewitness identification expert (R. 253:22). 
1
 The trial judge and counsel agreed to forgo putting Ms. Gaffney on the stand at 
the motion hearing and to rely instead on Ms. Gaffney's testimony at the first trial for 
determining the reliability of her identification (R. 253:23-25). 
2 
At the second trial held May 17-18, 2000, a jury convicted defendant of aggravated 
burglary and robbery and acquitted him of unlawful possession of burglary tools (R. 257: 5). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to a statutory five-to-life prison term on the aggravated 
burglary conviction and to a one-to-fifteen-years term on the robbery conviction, the 
commitments to be served concurrently (R. 230-31). Defendant timely appealed (R. 233). 
The Utah Supreme Court assigned the case to this Court (R. 243-45). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
On June 12, 1999, sixty-nine-year-old Joyce Gaffney was lying on her bed watching 
television in her home located in the Glendale area of Salt Lake County (R. 251:111,113). 
Because it had been a warm day, Ms. Gaffney had opened her kitchen and front room 
windows and drawn back the curtains (R. 251:114, 117). At approximately 6:00 p.m., Ms. 
Gaffney's house alarm went off (R. 251:113, 127). Ms. Gaffney looked away from the 
television and saw a "streak go... from the kitchen into the front room" (R. 251:116). Ms. 
Gaffney assumed that her granddaughter, notorious for accidentally setting off the alarm, 
had once again tripped the alarm and entered the house (R. 251:116, 141). 
Ms. Gaffney arose from the bed and walked towards the front of the house (R. 
251:116). While still in the hallway, Ms. Gaffney saw defendant in the front room looking 
2
 The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings. State 
v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In accord with the parties' 
agreement to have the trial court determine the reliability of the eyewitness identification 
based on her testimony at the first trial, the facts are taken from that proceeding. 
3 
out the peep hole of the front door (R. 251:117, 119). She yelled, "[w]hat are you doing in 
my house?" (R. 251:119). Defendant, who was "20 feet" from Ms. Gaffney, turned around 
and looked at her (R. 251:119). 
Once defendant turned around, Ms. Gaffney was able to "clearly" see defendant's 
"facial features" and determine that he was a thin, African-American male, approximately 
six feet tall (R. 251:17,136,172-73).3 Ms. Gaffney also noticed that defendant had a goatee, 
was wearing "dark clothing" and a turned-around baseball cap, and that he had "mean eyes" 
(R. 251:136-37). Ms. Gaffney's ability to see the defendant was enhanced by the natural day 
light coming through the windows (R. 251:117). Upon seeing Ms. Gaffney, defendant 
screamed, "Money, Bitch" and then "[m]ade a mad dash" towards her (R. 251:119-120). 
Upon reaching Ms. Gaffhey, defendant began shoving her (R. 251:120-21). 
Defendant repeatedly screamed at her, demanding money and calling her "[b]itch" (R. 
251:120). Defendant shoved Ms. Gaffhey a total of "five or six times" (R. 251:120). 
Defendant remained face to face and "in front o f Ms. Gaffney while shoving her (R. 
251:122). Ms. Gaffhey responded by defensively pushing against the defendant and 
screaming at him "I don't have any [money]" (R. 251:120-121). Even though Ms. Gaffney 
never fell to the ground, she suffered leg and back problems as a result of defendant's assault 
(R. 251:121). 
Defendant eventually pushed Ms. Gaffney from one end to the other end of the 
3
 Ms. Gaffney is Caucasian (R. 255:132). 
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hallway (R. 251:122). Upon reaching the back of the hallway, defendant left iMs. Gaffney 
and ran into her bedroom (R. 251:122). While defendant was in the bedroom grabbing Ms. 
Gaffney's purse, Ms. Gaffney ran to the kitchen door (R. 251:122). Ms. Gaffney had the door 
partially opened and was "three quarters of the way out" when defendant caught up with her 
again (R. 251:123). Defendant pushed the door against Ms. Gaffney, trying to prevent her 
from leaving the house (R. 251:123). Ms. Gaffney, however, successfully squeezed through 
the door opening and ran outside (R. 251:123). 
Once Ms. Gaffney was outside, defendant ran up behind her and shoved her against 
the garage (R. 251:124). Defendant then ran past Ms. Gaffney, still holding her purse as 
various items fell out as he fled (R. 251:124). After jumping the fence that surrounded Ms. 
Gaffney's house, defendant dropped the purse and ran east, towards the railroad tracks and 
Jordan River Park (R. 251:125-26). 
After defendant left, Ms. Gaffney, frightened and upset, asked for help from a young 
man who was walking with his child past her house (R. 251:127, 146). The man advised 
Ms. Gaffney to call 911 (R. 251:146). In less than a minute after Ms. Gaffney called for 
help, Officer Jason Knight of the Salt Lake City Police Department, who was on patrol one 
block from Ms. Gaffney's home, arrived (R. 251:127, 152-53, 158-59). He inspected Ms. 
Gaffney's house and the surrounding yard and noticed that defendant had entered the house 
by placing a chair underneath the kitchen window and by cutting the screen to the kitchen 
window (R. 251:160). 
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While Officer Knight inspected Ms. Gaffney's home, other Salt Lake City police 
officers searched the surrounding area for someone matching defendant's description (R. 
251:170). Officer Tracy Ita saw defendant exiting the Jordan River Park, located only a 
couple blocks east of Ms. Gaffney's house (R. 251:172). Officer Ita stopped and questioned 
defendant because he matched the description given by dispatch, "a male Black adult, 
approximately six foot, thin build, wearing dark clothing and a black baseball cap, with a 
goatee" (R. 251:172-74). 
Upon stopping defendant, Officer Ita noticed that defendant's "face [was] literally 
dripping with sweat" (R. 251:174, 178). Defendant was also carrying a blue duffle bag (R. 
251:178). A search of the bag incident to defendant's arrest revealed numerous CD. 's, a pair 
of knit gloves, a screw driver, and some drug paraphernalia (R. 251:178).4 
After searching defendant, police called Ms. Gaffhey and informed her that they had 
found a "possible suspect" (R. 251:134-135, 148). Within fifteen minutes of the offense, 
Officer Knight drove Ms. Gaffhey a couple of blocks to where defendant was being detained 
(R. 251:135, 163). Officer Knight did not discuss with Ms. Gaffney the identity of the 
"possible suspect" being detained by the police (R. 251:163). 
While remaining in the car, Ms. Gaffney was asked if she could identify the suspect 
(R. 251:137). Defendant was handcuffed and standing with his back to Ms. Gaffhey (R. 
4
 The drug paraphernalia included a marijuana pipe, a crack pipe, a copper sponge, 
and a spoon with burn marks (R. 251.181-82). 
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251:148). Ms. Gaffney asked that defendant be turned around Gaffney (R. 251:148). Upon 
seeing defendant's face, Ms. Gaffney immediately identified him as being the man who had 
entered her house (R. 251:137,148). 
When Ms. Gaffney identified defendant, it was still light outside (R. 251.138). She 
was approximately seven feet from the defendant (R. 251:138). Ms. Gaffney, who wears 
bifocals for reading purposes, was not wearing her glasses at either the time of the incident 
in her house, nor at the time she identified defendant (R. 251: 139-40; R. 255:133). Ms. 
Gaffney had received a full night's sleep the night before the incident and was not on 
medications, drugs, or alcohol during either the incident in her home or at the show-up (R. 
251:133-34, 160). 
Defendant was interviewed by Officer Martin Kaufman two days after the offense (R. 
251:219). After receiving his Miranda rights, defendant denied any involvement in the 
incident (R. 251:226-27). He also told Officer Kaufman that he had been in the park for an 
hour or two and that he was sweating heavily when apprehended because he had just been 
running (R. 251:219-21). Defendant also claimed that he was in the park with a male friend, 
but that he would not divulge his friend's identity because he had a warrant out for his arrest 
(R. 251: 220,227). At the second trial, a woman, Ms. Merri Ann June, testified that she was 
the alibi referred to by defendant and that except for a ten minute interval, she was in Jordan 
7 
Park with defendant for approximately an hour prior to his arrest (R. 256:10-12).5 Ms. June 
further testified that she and the defendant had not been running prior to his arrest, but had 
been "sitting under a shade tree" (R. 256:17). Officer Ita testified that he did not see Ms. 
June at Jordan Park when defendant was placed under arrest, and that the only people located 
in the park at that time were a Native American male and a Native American female (R. 
251:175; R. 256.30). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Based on factors adopted in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the 
eyewitness identification was reliable. The victim, although admittedly scared after the 
incident, had a good opportunity to view defendant's full face during the encounter in very 
favorable conditions, her testimony remained consistent, and her identification was not the 
product of suggestion. In fact, the circumstances of the identification were clearly superior 
to those in Ramirez in every particular. Additionally, the trial court's findings were well 
supported by the record. 
5
 Ms. June had attended the first trial, but did not come forward as an alibi witness 
for defendant until the second trial (R. 256:25). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY 
RELIABLE 
Defendant claims that the circumstances rendered the victim's identification 
unreliable under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. He further asserts that the trial 
court's findings to the contrary were clearly erroneous. Aplt. Br. at 12-22. The record belies 
both assertions. 
A. The Eye-witness Identification of Defendant was Constitutionally Reliable 
In State v. Ramirez, the Utah Supreme Court extended its recognition that eyewitness 
testimony is both potent yet fallible, see State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488-91 (Utah 1986), 
thereby requiring the trial court, in cases where eyewitness identification was central to the 
case, to undertake "an in-depth appraisal of the identification's reliability," before admitting 
such testimony under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774, 780 (Utah 1991). Noting that "[t]he ultimate question to be determined is whether, 
under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable," this Court listed the 
following pertinent factors by which reliability must be determined: 
(1) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2) the 
witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the 
witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and 
mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was made spontaneously 
and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of 
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and the likelihood 
9 
that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it correctly. This last area 
includes such factors as whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind of 
the observer during the time it was observed, and whether the race of the actor 
was the same as the observer's. 
Id. at 781 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493). The burden is on the State to show that the 
identification is reliable. Id. at 778. 
Defendant argues that an application of the five Ramirez factors shows that Ms. 
Gaffney's identification of him was constitutionally unreliable. Aplt. Br. at 12-15. 
Specifically, defendant argues that Ms. Gaffney's identification should have been suppressed 
because "[t]he eyewitness in this case viewed the assailant for a few seconds before being 
attacked; the witness was distracted by a loud alarm; her fright, and concerns for her safety; 
she was not wearing her glasses; she identified Appellant at a blatantly suggestive show-up; 
and the assailant was a different race than the witness." Aplt. Br. at 1. To the contrary, 
applying the Ramirez factors shows that Ms. Gaffney's testimony is constitutionally reliable. 
Indeed, the identification in this case was made in far more favorable circumstances in every 
particular than the identification in Ramirez, which was also found to be constitutionally 
reliable. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782-84. 
I. The opportunity of Ms. Gaffney to view the defendant during the event 
The first Ramirez factor to be considered in assessing an identification for reliability 
is the witness's opportunity to view the defendant. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782. This includes 
examining "the length of time the witness viewed the actor; the distance between the witness 
and the actor; [and] whether the witness could view the actor's face." Id. The quality of 
10 
light and presence of distractions are also considered under the first factor. Id. 
Ms. Gaffney had ample opportunity to view defendant. Ms. Gaffney first saw 
defendant's face from twenty feet away when he turned to face her (R. 251:116, 119; R. 
255:99, 101). At this moment, Ms. Gaffney was able to "see [defendant's] facial features 
clearly" and determine that he was a thin African-American male who wore a goatee (R. 
251:136; R. 255:102). Ms. Gaffney then continued to observe defendant, who was directly 
in front of her, while he shoved her in the hallway (R. 251:122; R. 255:100, 105).6 Ms. 
Gaffney again saw defendant when he forced the door on her to prevent her from leaving the 
house (R. 251: 123). Lastly, Ms. Gaffney had the opportunity to view defendant as he ran 
past her, jumped the fence, and fled away from her home (R. 251:124-26). 
In each of the locations Ms. Gaffney viewed defendant, the lighting was good and 
allowed her to clearly see defendant's face (R. 251:117,136). Although the alarm sounded 
throughout the incident (R. 251:127), there is no evidence that Ms. Gaffney found it a visual 
distraction, as defendant asserts. See Aplt. Br. at 15-16. In fact, she specifically paid 
attention to defendant's face, which was unmasked (R. 251:136, 150). Thus, Ms. Gaffney 
6
 Defendant argues that at trial Ms. Gaffney admitted that while she was being 
shoved in the hallway, she did not pay attention to her assailant. Aplt. Br. at 15. Ms. 
Gaffney, however, clarified this statement, originally made at the preliminary hearing, at 
the second trial (R. 249:20; 251:142; R. 255:123). At the second trial, Ms. Gaffney 
simply stated that she wasn't able to "tell whether [defendant] was inebriated" when he 
was shoving her (R. 249:20; 255:123). More importantly, Ms. Gaffney also stated at this 
trial that she "did not have any difficulty seeing [defendant's] face" while the shoving 
occurred (R. 255:102). 
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observed defendant in three locations within her home from various distances and angles. 
While each of these observations was brief, in combination they allowed Ms. Gaffney a more 
than adequate opportunity to view defendant. 
2. Ms. Gaffney's degree of attention to defendant at the time of the event 
The second reliability factor examines the witness' degree of attention to the 
defendant. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783. This factor looks at whether the witness was "fully 
aware [of] what was taking place" Id. 
Ms. Gaffney was fully aware that defendant had broken into her home (R. 251:119). 
From the moment she saw defendant, Ms. Gaffhey was undistractedly intent on observing 
defendant and on escaping from him (R. 251:119-126, 136). 
3. Ms. Gaffney's capacity to observe the event9 
including her physical and mental acuity 
The third reliability factor focuses on the physical and mental capacities of the 
witness. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783. "Here the relevant circumstances include whether the 
witness's capacity to observe was impaired." Id. Possible impairments are "stress or fright 
. . . personal motivations, biases, or prejudices, by uncorrected visual defects, or by fatigue, 
injury, drugs, or alcohol. Id. 
Ms. Gaffhey was not under the influence of drugs, medications, or alcohol when she 
initially observed and later identified defendant (R. 251:133; R. 255:95). She testified that 
the night before the incident she "had a full night's sleep" (R. 251:133-34). She also stated 
that she did not feel "fatigued or stressed" before the incident (R. 251:134). There is also no 
12 
indication in the record that Ms. Gaffney's observation was impaired by personal 
motivations, biases, or prejudices. 
Defendant argues that Ms. Gaffney was "so frightened and upset that she lacked 
presence of mind to call the police." Aplt. Br. at 16. However, that argument refers only to 
Ms. Gaffney's state of mind after the encounter and fails to undermine her testimony that 
during the encounter she could "clearly" see defendant's face (R. 251:136). 
Defendant also argues that Ms. Gaffney's capacity to observe was further impaired 
because she was not wearing her eyeglasses at the time of the incident. Thus, defendant 
argues, "Ms. Gaffney only had a single brief glance of the assailant in the living room 
outside the range of her visual defect." Aplt. Br. at 17. 
Defendant, overstates the extent of Ms. Gaffney's visual problems. Ms. Gaffney 
must wear eyeglasses in order to read small characters at very close range, such as letters in 
a book or numbers on price tags at the grocery store (R. 251:117-18,140; R. 255:95-96). She 
does not, however, need to wear eyeglasses for viewing larger objects, such as faces within 
close range (R. 251:117-18,140; R. 255:118-20). At both the first and second trials, the 
prosecutor tested Ms. Gaffney's eyesight at various distances (R. 251:118; R. 255:96-97). 
Without the use of her glasses, Ms. Gaffney stated that she could "clearly" see the prosecutor 
at distances beyond two or three feet and that even when viewing pictures, i.e., exhibits, she 
"did not really need them" (R. 251:118; R. 255:96-97, 118-20). Thus, the fact that Ms. 
Gaffney was not wearing her reading glasses during the incident did not interfere with her 
13 
ability to clearly discern defendant's features throughout his intrusion at her house and at the 
show-up, where she saw him from approximately seven feet (R. 251:138). 
4. Whether Ms. Gaffney Js identification was made spontaneously 
and remained consistent, or whether it was the product of suggestion 
The fourth reliability factor assesses the genuineness of the identification. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d at 783. The circumstances considered involve "the length of time that passed 
between the witness's observations at the time of the event and the identification of 
defendant; the witness's mental capacity and state of mind at the time of the identification; 
the witness's exposure to opinions, descriptions, identifications, or other information from 
other sources." Id. Other important circumstances include those "instances when the witness 
or other eyewitnesses gave a description of the actor that is inconsistent with defendant [and] 
circumstances under which defendant was presented to the witness for identification." Id. 
This factor explores "whether the witness's identification was... the product of suggestion." 
Id. at 784 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493). 
Ms. Gaffney identified defendant at the show-up only fifteen minutes after the 
incident in her house, thus minimizing the memory-degrading effect of time (R. 251:135). 
See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783. Nothing in the record indicates that Ms. Gaffney's mental or 
emotional state at the show-up identification was extraordinary for the circumstances or 
interfered with her ability to make a reliable identification. Ms. Gaffney was also not 
exposed to any other opinions or other sources of information concerning defendant which 
would have altered the show-up identification. 
14 
Defendant argues that the show-up identification of the defendant was "a product of 
suggestion." Aplt. Br. at 18. Salt Lake City police officers, however, were careful in the 
procedures used for the show-up identification. Once defendant was placed in custody, 
police officers called and informed Ms. Gaffney that they had a "possible suspect" (R. 
251:148). Officer Kennedy expressly stated that he did not discuss law enforcement's 
apprehension of a suspect while driving Ms. Gaffney to the showup (R. 251:163; R. 
255:159). At the show-up, Ms. Gaffney remained in the car and was shown defendant who 
was standing approximately seven feet away from her (R.251: 137,148-49; R. 255:130-31). 
Defendant was handcuffed and standing with his back to Ms. Gaffney (R. 251 :137; R. 
255:161). While there were a few policemen standing next to defendant, there were no lights 
shining on defendant, as it was still light outside (R. 251:138; 255:159-60; R. 255:134). 
When defendant was turned to face Ms. Gaffney, she immediately identified him as her 
assailant (R. 251:137-38). 
Ms. Gaffney's description of the incident, defendant's features, and the substance of 
the verbal exchange between defendant and her remained consistent through three separate 
hearings. Particularly, she described defendant as a tall African-American man who wore 
facial hair, had "mean eyes," and who wore dark clothing and a turned-around baseball cap. 
(R.249:8,25;251:136-37,144-45;R.255:106-07,127). The photograph taken of defendant 
twenty minutes after the show-up identification shows that he matched Ms. Gaffney's 
description (R. 251:164; State Exhibit 6). 
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The only point on which defendant challenges the consistency of Ms. Gaffney's 
identification is the apparent discrepancy between her statement to the 911 operator that 
defendant's shirt was "plaid," and her testimony at the second trial that the shirt was blue and 
white. Aplt. Br. at 10 n.5, 18. This inconsistency is insignificant. First, the trial court's 
ruling was necessarily made before the second trial, and thus this inconsistency cannot 
reasonably detract from the court's ruling. Second, even assuming testimony from the 
second trial is relevant, Ms. Gaffney emphasized that "[t]he only reason I [said plaid] is 
because I could remember seeing the white and blue" (R.255:127). With respect to Ms. 
Gaffhey's odd use of the word, "plaid," defendant fails to credit Ms. Gaffney's somewhat 
idiosyncratic use of language. For example, Gaffney described defendant's facial hair as a 
"mustache [which] went down and crossed [defendant's] chin" (R. 251:137; 255:107). Not 
until the prosecutor used the word, "goatee" several times to express her description of 
defendant's facial hair did Ms. Gaffney use that term (R. 255:107). The fact that the shirt 
defendant was wearing when he was apprehended was "black" or "dark" (R. 251:172; 
255:164-65), only minimally conflicts with her description of the shirt as "blue." In any 
event, defendant concedes that Ms. Gaffney's identification "remained fairly consistent." 
Aplt. Br. at 18. In fact, the consistency of Ms. Gaffney's descriptions of defendant at the 
preliminary hearing and at the first trial was a relevant factor for the trial judge in deciding 
toadmit her eyewitness identification at the second trial (R. 253:35). 
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5. The nature of the event being observed by Ms. Gaffney and the 
likelihood that she would perceive, remember and relate it correctly 
The last reliability factor concerns the nature of the incident observed and the 
likelihood of it being perceived and remembered correctly by the witness. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
at 781. "This last area includes such factors as whether the event was an ordinary one in the 
mind of the observer during the time it was observed and whether the race of the actor was 
the same as the observer's." Id. 
Plainly, the entire incident was unique and memorable in Ms. Gaffney's experience. 
Further, although Ms. Gaffney is Caucasian (R. 255:132), her cross-racial identification of 
defendant may be quite sensitive. See Long, 721 P.2d 489 (recognizing that" identifications 
tend to be more accurate where the person observing and the one being observed are of the 
same race") (citations omitted). Ms. Gaffney testified that she had many African-American 
friends, her "daughter was married to [an African-American male], and she has "two half-
Black grandchildren" (R.251:134, 146). 
In sum, an application of the Ramirez factors shows that the trial court correctly 
determined that, under the totality of circumstances, Ms. Gaffney's identification of 
defendant was constitutionally reliable. 
B. Ms. Gaffney's identification is superior to 
the eyewitness identification in Ramirez. 
While the foregoing, particularized application of the Ramirez factors demonstrates 
the reliability of Ms. Gaffney's identification, that reliability is even more readily and simply 
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proven by comparing this case with Ramirez itself 
In Ramirez, the Utah Supreme Court found reliable the identification of a gunman in 
a nighttime robbery. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 884. The eyewitness, all the time under attack 
from a pipe-wielding accomplice to the offense, identified the masked gunman (the 
defendant) as he hid behind the corner of a building at a distance variously described as from 
ten to thirty feet. Id. at 776, 782-84. The eyewitness viewed the defendant in time periods 
variously described as from one second to a minute or longer in lighting variously described 
as from "good" to "poor." Id. at 782-83. Prior to the showup, police officers told the 
eyewitness that they had apprehended a suspect who matched the description given to them. 
Id. at 784. At the showup conducted in the middle of the night, Ramirez had the headlights 
from several police cars focused on him. Id. Notwithstanding that the case was "extremely 
close," the Ramirez court held that "[considering the facts in the light most favorable to the 
trial court's decision and giving due deference to the trial judge's ability to appraise demeanor 
evidence, we cannot say that [the eyewitness's] testimony is legally insufficient when 
considered in light of the other circumstances to warrant a preliminary finding of reliability 
and, therefore, admissibility." Id. 
By contrast, the circumstances of Ms. Gaffney's identification were far more 
favorable than those in Ramirez. Ms. Gaffney viewed her assailant from many different 
angles and distances, in daylight, in her own apartment, and for a longer period of time than 
did the eyewitness in Ramirez. During this time, Ms. Gaffney could "clearly" make out 
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defendant's facial features (R.251:117, 136; R. 255:100, 105). Defendant was unmasked 
(R.251:136). Ms. Gaffney was not given suggestive information by the police officers 
concerning the description of the defendant, nor was defendant even spotlighted at the 
showup, which occurred in daylight (R.251:138,163). Defendant admits that Ms. Gaffney's 
identification remained "fairly consistent." Aplt. Br. at 18. In sum, even a cursory 
comparison of the facts of this case with Ramirez compels the conclusion that Ms. Gaffney's 
eyewitness identification was reliable and, therefore, admissible. 
C. The trial court's findings of fact are supported by the evidence. 
Defendant argues that because the record fails to support the trial court's actual 
findings, "they 'are against the clear weight of the evidence' and require reversal." Aplt. Br. 
at 19 (quotting Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782). Specifically, defendant argues for reversal 
because the trial court (1) found that defendant "slowly" pushed his victim down the hallway, 
(2) credited Ms. Gaffney's apparent confidence in her identification, (3) discounted the 
discrepancy between Ms. Gaffney's description of her assailant's shirt and defendant's 
clothes, and even speculated that defendant might have changed clothes in the park, (4) failed 
to consider other compromising aspects of Ms. Gaffney's identification, and (5) abdicated 
its gatekeeping function by granting defendant the benefit of an eyewitness identification 
expert. Aplt's Br. at 19-21. 
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Defendant's assertions may be treated in summary fashion. 
1. Victim was "slowly"pushed 
This argument focuses on a trivial deviation from the literal record. The State 
acknowledges that the record does not state the rate at which defendant pushed Ms. Gaffney. 
However, the trial court's reference is only part of the its overall assessment of the first 
Ramirez factor, the eyewitness's opportunity to observe. Defendant fails to discuss the other 
bases for the court's ruling on this factor, to wit: that "she was scared, but she was paying 
attention to defendant's face;" "[s]he was looking at his face;" "they were face to face;" "[h]e 
was saying words to her" (R. 253:35). These findings are well supported in the record (R. 
251:17,136,172-73). Indeed, the court might reasonably have surmised, based on his view 
of Ms. Gaffney as she testified, that a sixty-nine-year-old woman could only have been 
"slowly" pushed if she did not fall. 
2. Victim was "pretty positive" in her identification 
The State acknowledges that to the extent the trial court may have identified Ms. 
Gaffney's "'pretty positive'[] testimony of the identification of [defendant]," with her 
"confidence," the trial court improperly imported a factor rejected by the Utah Supreme 
Court in assessing eyewitness reliability. See State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, % 16, 413 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3 (rejecting "the 'level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the 
confrontation' as a factor to be used in determining the constitutional reliability of an 
identification") (quoting Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781). However, defendant singles out this one 
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irrelevant factor in the reliability assessment to the exclusion of other relevant observations 
the trial court was legitimately entitled to make concerning Ms. Gaffney's demeanor on the 
witness stand. The court also found her "credible," "convincing," "reliable," "quite calm," 
that her "mental acuity was excellent," and that "her testimony and her identification has 
remained consistent throughout the course of. . . the trial" (R. 24, 35). In fact, while 
Ramirez rejects the use of the eyewitness's level of certainty as a reliability factor, it 
expressly bows to the trial court's privileged position to "appraise demeanor evidence." 
Ramirez, &\7 ?2d at 1S4. 
3. Discrepancy between victim 9s description of defendant's 
shirt and defendant's clothes when he was apprehended 
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the trial court particularly noted that Ms. Gaffhey's 
description of defendant's clothes was somewhat discrepant from those he was found in (R. 
253:24,35). However, the court also noted that some of the clothes matched (R. 253:24,35). 
The record fully supports this finding (R. 251:172-74). Considering this discrepancy, the 
State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, 413 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 20 
court stated: "As far as I am concerned, it is not enough to disqualify the showup or make 
it inadmissible" (R. 253:35). In light of the discrepancy, the trial court mused about the 
possibility of defendant's having changed his shirt in the park (R. 253:35). Plainly, the court 
was merely speculating and not making a formal finding of fact. 
4. Failure to consider other compromising factors in the victim Js identification 
In Ramirez, the supreme court stated: "[T]his court upholds the trial court even if it 
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failed to make findings on the record whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the 
court actually made such findings." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 787-88 n.6. In arguing that the 
trial court failed to factor in various factors that apparently detract from the reliability of Ms. 
Gaffney's identification, defendant has failed to acknowledge the foregoing directive in 
Ramirez. Subpart B of this brief, supra, discusses at length the substantial record support 
underlying the trial court's simple conclusion, that Ms. Gaffney had a good opportunity to 
observe defendant, she was credible, her identification remained consistent, and, 
notwithstanding some discrepancies in her observations from apparent fact, her identification 
was reliable (R. 253:35-36). 
5. Surrender of gatekeeping function by granting 
defendant the benefit of an eyewitness identification expert 
The record belies defendant's assertion that the trial court buoyed up its reliability 
determination by allowing him to present an eyewitness identification expert. After 
acknowledging that defendant would be free to argue all the weaknesses of Ms. Gaffney's 
identification through the expert's testimony and the cautionary instruction, the trial court 
concluded by stating: "But I find everything to be reliable enough to allow the identification 
to go ahead" (R. 253:36). Thus, the trial court expressly announced its belief that Ms. 
Gaffney's identification was sufficiently reliable by itself, independent of whatever strength 
defendant's case obtained by having the benefit of an eyewitness identification expert. 
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In sum, the trial court's findings in support of its conclusion that the victim's 
eyewitness identification of defendant was reliable are clearly supported by the weight of the 
record evidence.7 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's 
conviction be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not request 
that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this H day of June, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
7
 Defendant also argues that because only Ms. Gaffney's identification linked him 
to the offense, the admission of her testimony, if erroneous, is not subject to harmless 
error analysis. Aplt. Br. at 22-25. Fairly substantial circumstantial evidence linked 
defendant to the offense. Specifically, Ms. Gaffney's description of defendant to the 911 
operator closely matched defendant's description and the clothes he was wearing when 
apprehended in the park (R. 251:172-74). Also, defendant was apprehended only a short 
time after the offense, still sweating heavily (R. 251:219-21). Finally, his alibi was 
evidently false, based on the substantial discrepancies between his statements when he 
was apprehended and Officer Ita's observations and Ms. June's testimony (R. 251:175 
220, 227; R. 256:10-12, 17, 30). However, the State acknowledges that this evidence is, 
by itself, insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction. 
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